Law and New Zealand's 2014 Election Campaign by Geddis, Andrew
117
Law and New Zealand’s 2014 election campaign
Andrew Geddis*
1 Introduction
New Zealand held its general election on September 20, 2014. The result 
was as decisive as it seems possible under the nation’s proportional 
representation voting system. The governing National Party won 60 
seats after gaining 47 per cent of the vote, just one short of an outright 
majority in the 121 seat House of Representatives. With the voters also 
returning three possible support parties to the House, no question arose 
as to whether National would be able to obtain the majority on confidence 
and supply matters necessary to remain in office. Furthermore, even 
supporters of the unsuccessful political parties generally accepted this 
outcome. Admittedly, some 9,300 individuals put their name to an online 
petition requesting that the chair of the Electoral Commission recount 
the votes because: “Something doesn’t seem right with recent the (sic) 
New Zealand election.” However, such feelings probably reflected the 
signatories’ immediate post-election disappointment at losing rather than 
any real belief that the final result somehow failed to capture the true 
preferences of those who had cast ballots. There certainly have been no 
widespread or ongoing claims that electoral error (or worse) calls into 
question the National Government’s right to govern.
New Zealand’s 2014 election thus “did its job”, in the sense that it 
produced an outcome that permitted a government to form and function 
in a way that those who then are governed by it broadly consider 
legitimate. The next part of this article will look at why elections are 
given this function. Before doing so, however, it should be noted that 
the 2014 election campaign and voting process did not proceed without 
any controversies or complications. Indeed, I argue that the very role 
that elections play inevitably produces disputes over the rules that 
should apply. The chief purpose of this article then is to consider a 
number of those disputes from 2014, explain what they were and why 
they arose, as well as analyse what they tell us about how New Zealand 
understands what democracy ought to mean for it. The article does so by 
first making some general points about why elections, and the law that 
governs how elections operate, matter in our contemporary constitutional 
environment. Against that background, part two addresses a number 
of specific electoral law issues. Part three looks at how New Zealand’s 
electoral law operates to define a set of political “ins” and “outs” in 
relation to the rules governing how television broadcasters must choose 
who to include in their leaders’ debates, the ban on sentenced prisoners 
voting and the prohibition on individuals enrolling to vote on polling 
day itself. Part four looks at the legal rules that govern electioneering 
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activities with respect to the prohibition on various activities on polling 
day and the regulation of those who publish “election advertisements”. 
I conclude in part five with some brief comments about how the various 
matters raised in this article may be responded to—and why this response 
will never represent a conclusive resolution.
2 Electoral law as a distinct field of study 
The process of voting for elected representatives following a campaign 
in which a wide range of interested individuals and groups subject 
the voters to various persuasive communication techniques—what 
I have termed the “electoral moment”1—is critical to New Zealand’s 
constitutional order. While there may be some disagreement about how 
sovereign our Parliament really is,2 the lack of any express higher law 
constraints upon its lawmaking power give it extraordinarily broad 
legislative reach. That lawmaking power may then be used in accordance 
with the views of a simple majority of those members of Parliament 
whom the people have chosen at the electoral moment to represent them. 
Furthermore, New Zealand’s Westminster legacy allocates executive 
power to those elected representatives who enjoy majority support on 
confidence and supply in the House of Representatives. That majority 
support, bolstered by strong norms of internal party discipline, allows 
those individuals holding executive power to exert a great deal of control 
over the legislative process. All of which is quite basic and familiar 
terrain for anyone who has been habituated to New Zealand’s way of 
governing itself; indeed, so familiar that it is often taken for granted. What 
I wish to do here is pause and consider the electoral moment’s function 
in both allocating public decision making power and legitimising that 
allocation within New Zealand, along with the role that electoral law 
plays in enabling it to do so. That investigation requires beginning with 
the talismanic role that “democracy” plays in our system of government.
It is now pretty much a given that democracy matters a lot in the 
discussions about constitutional theory that occur in WEIRD3 countries 
like New Zealand. To co-opt Jeremy Webber’s turn of phrase, it stands as 
“the first principle of contemporary constitutionalism”.4 Of course, this 
claim can only be made because the term “democracy” is flexible enough 
1 A Geddis, “Three Conceptions of the Electoral Moment” (2003) 28 AJLP 
53.
2 See, eg, J Goldsworthy, “Is Parliament Sovereign?: Recent Challenges to 
the Doctrine of Parliamentary Sovereignty” (2005) 3 NZJPIL 7; S Elias, 
“Mapping the Constitutional” [2014] NZLR 1 at 13–16.
3 The acronym stands for “Western, Educated, Industrialised, Rich, 
Democratic”, and was coined by J Henrich, S Heine S & A Norenzayan, 
“The weirdest people in the world?” (2010) 33 Behavioral and Brain 
Sciences 61.
4 J Webber, “Democratic Decision Making as the First Principle of 
Contemporary Constitutionalism”, in R Bauman and T Kahana (eds), The 
Least Examined Branch: The Role of Legislatures in the Constitutional State 
(Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2006) at 411.
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to be deployed in theoretical approaches as diverse as those espoused by 
(for example) Ronald Dworkin,5 Jeremy Waldron6 and Richard Posner.7 
Yet in spite of deep disagreement about the exact interpretation and 
application of the term as such thinkers use it, there exists a minimal 
(or thin)8 core of meaning common to each. That is to say, all democratic 
constitutionalists—by which I mean pretty much everyone operating 
in WEIRD countries like New Zealand where the orthodox tradition 
of liberal constitutional thinking enjoys hegemony—accepts that some 
degree of lawmaking authority ought to be reposed in the hands of 
representatives selected by those people who will thereafter be subject 
to laws made by their representatives. Obviously disputes exist over 
how much lawmaking authority elected representatives ought to hold. 
Should it be untrammelled by any formal legal limits (as is the case in 
New Zealand)? Should it be divided amongst more than one set of elected 
representatives (as is the case in the United States, Australia, Canada and 
(to a lesser extent) the United Kingdom)? Should it be subject to override 
by the judiciary in the name of individual rights (as is the case in the 
United States, Canada and (arguably) the United Kingdom)? Or, should 
it be subject to override by the voters themselves (as in jurisdictions 
that permit binding direct democracy initiatives)? But these non-trivial 
matters aside, the common starting point is that in a properly constituted 
society the people, at the very least, ought to be able to choose who will 
get to write the first draft of a great many of the laws under which they 
subsequently must live. 
Having identified this (albeit quite narrow) common ground, we 
then immediately are confronted with a range of further issues. For 
what does it mean for the people to choose representatives to make (at 
least some) law on their behalf? First, it requires a decision as to who 
is and who is not a part of “the people” for the purposes of making the 
choice. Is it only citizens who get to participate, or all persons entitled to 
reside permanently in the country? What about citizens (or permanent 
residents) who reside overseas? At what age ought a person be entitled 
to take part? Should persons suffering from some mental incapacity 
be permitted to join in? Do we include persons who are presently 
imprisoned (or even have been imprisoned in the past) for committing 
some criminal offence? 
Second, given that the “people” (however this is defined) of a country 
will never unanimously agree that any one particular individual, much 
less a group of individuals, should wield lawmaking authority over 
5 R Dworkin, Is Democracy Possible Here? Principles for a New Political Debate 
(Princeton University Press, Princeton, 2008).
6 J Waldron, “The Core of the Case Against Judicial Review” (2003) 115 
Yale L J 1346.
7 R Posner, Law, Pragmatism and Democracy (Harvard University Press, 
Cambridge MA, 2003).
8 J Allan, “Thin Beats Fat Yet Again: Conceptions of Democracy” (2006) 25 
L & Phil 533.
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them, there needs to be some way that they can choose from amongst 
the various individuals and groups competing for that right. Even if we 
accept as a basic principle that this selection ought to occur by way of 
voting at elections (and not by, say, lottery or the like), there is a plethora 
of voting systems that then could be adopted. For whom should those 
entitled to vote be able to vote for: an individual candidate of their choice; 
a number of candidates of their choice; a political party that chooses who 
will represent it; or some mix of the above? Is the support of a majority of 
those voting or a mere plurality required before the people are deemed 
to have chosen some individual to serve as their representative? Should 
the choices of voters be represented in a proportionate fashion, or should 
we adopt a winner takes all approach? 
And third, given that there will be a number of competing individuals 
and groups seeking to have the people choose them as their lawmaking 
representatives, there also need to be rules to govern the way in which 
that competition is conducted. How should money be given to, and spent 
by, those seeking to be elected as representatives (or other individuals or 
groups interested in the outcome of that process)? What information may 
be placed before the people, and in what form, and at what times? How 
should proper (or, at least, acceptable) inducements to vote in a particular 
way be distinguished from improper (or, at least, unacceptable) ones?
While these various issues are controversial in the sense that there are 
different possible answers that may be given to each of them and the 
inherent conceptual fuzziness attached to the term “democracy” means 
there is no precise metric that allows us to declare one solution to be 
the indisputably right one, they nevertheless require a single generally 
accepted (even if not universally agreed upon) answer before an election 
can be held. We simply cannot have a representative selection process 
in which each individual participant gets to decide for him or herself 
who is or is not a part of the people for the purposes of exercising that 
choice, or what constitutes a choice of one particular individual or set 
of individuals over another, or how such choices legitimately may be 
influenced. Or, rather, we could have such a process, but it would not be 
fit for the desired purpose of allocating lawmaking authority according 
to the people’s expressed preferences because it would not be capable 
of producing a result other than chaos. Consequently, in order to put 
the first principle of contemporary constitutionalism into practice, any 
country must have in place before an election is held a quite detailed set of 
laws that govern everything from who can vote through how they will 
vote to how those votes will be translated into the right to represent and 
the means by which the electorate’s votes may be influenced. So when we 
say that the people of a country have chosen a person or set of persons 
as their representatives to wield lawmaking authority over them, what 
we really mean is that the election process as it is constituted under that 
country’s laws has produced a particular outcome (while understanding 
that a different election process constituted under a different set of laws 
very well may have produced another result). 
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None of which is to assert that a given election is immune to criticism 
for failing to produce a properly democratic outcome. So, for example, 
an electoral process containing laws that exclude serving prisoners 
from voting, or that seek to restrict campaign spending by candidates 
or other participants, or that fail to provide representation to minority 
groups, or that require prospective voters to present particular forms 
of identification at the polling station may be claimed to fall short of 
allowing the “people” (properly understood) to “choose” (properly 
understood) who will act as their lawmaking representatives. However, 
such criticisms amount to a claim that the outcome of some alternative 
electoral process conducted under a different set of laws would be a better 
(in the sense of more consistent with “democracy”, properly understood) 
way for the people to choose their lawmaking representatives. Resolving 
such a claim then involves debating what is the best understanding 
of democracy in a particular societal context, as well as the rules and 
institutions then required to instantiate that understanding.9  Those are 
important questions that warrant serious discussion. Nevertheless, the 
relevant point for present purposes is that however they are answered, 
the resultant electoral process requires a pre-existing set of laws that 
both defines the people’s choice of legislators and thereby confers some 
measure of lawmaking authority upon those individuals in constitutional 
terms.
It is against this backdrop that electoral law has emerged as a distinct 
field of study.10 It seeks to bring together the normative aspects of 
democratic theory as a means of legitimising public power with the 
factual role the law plays in establishing the rules, procedures and 
processes that make up the electoral moment. Or, to put it another way, it 
combines asking what a properly operating democratic electoral process 
ought to look like with an examination of how the law shapes the way 
that elections actually take place. This combination then means that the 
field of electoral law is not a stable one, but rather is subject to continual 
re-evaluation and change. As explained elsewhere:
[E]lections—along with the legal rules that govern the electoral process—
will always produce disagreement, even as they resolve the question 
9 We also should note that debates over what is the “best” understanding 
of democracy for a given society include the fact that “elections should 
be understood as rituals conducted with their own inbuilt rhythms”; 
G Orr, Ritual and Rhythm in Electoral Systems: A Comparative Legal Account 
(Ashgate, Farnham 2015) at 9. In other words, the look and feel of the 
electoral process is just as important a consideration as whether the 
rules that govern it match up with abstract notions such as “equality”, 
“fairness” or “freedom”. 
10 For discussions of “electoral law” as a distinct field of study, see G Orr, 
“The Cinderella Status of Electoral Law as a Field of Study in Australia” 
(1998) 7 Griffith L Rev 166, at 167; Symposium, “Election Law as Its Own 
Field of Study” (1999) 32 Loyola of LA L Rev 1095 at 1095–96; H Gerken, 
“Election Law Exceptionalism? A Bird’s Eye View of the Symposium” 
(2002) 82 Bos U L Rev 737 at 738.
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of who will govern the country. In part, this is because elections are 
unavoidably partisan political affairs. Different electoral participants 
may well favour a set of legal rules that they believe will improve their 
chances of gaining a mandate through the election process, thereby 
granting them public decision-making power. There simply is no avoiding 
this basic political reality. Yet, at a deeper level, disagreement over the 
appropriate legal rules for our electoral process reflects the diversity of 
interpretations in our society as to exactly what, as a normative matter, 
justifies our decision to treat the majority’s preferences as conclusively 
determining who should gain public decision-making power. It comes 
from the very fact that we will have different visions of what the concept 
of democracy should mean for us as a particular society.11
Furthermore, law’s role in determining as a matter of fact how an 
election should be held itself creates potential conflicts. Law is not 
like a Lego instruction booklet that comprehensively sets out one and 
only one right way to assemble the pieces into a final pre-determined 
product. It inevitably contains ambiguities, gaps and uncertainties that 
must be resolved in order for it to do its job of establishing commonly 
binding rules, procedures and processes. Various institutions then play 
different roles in resolving those ambiguities, filling those gaps and 
settling those uncertainties. The way that they do so often is subject to 
choice; choice that is exercised in accordance with what the institution 
believes is the best understanding of what the law means. In turn, such 
best understandings are in part shaped by background understandings 
of what a properly operating democratic election process ought to look 
like, which is (as already noted) a matter of some disagreement. The 
consequence is that these various institutions may then reach diverging 
conclusions as to how the law ought to be interpreted and applied to 
particular facts. For this reason, inter-institutional arrangements also 
are a part of the picture; which institution gets to decide how matters 
of dispute will be resolved and what forms of oversight is it subject to?
The rest of this article examines how the kinds of issues canvassed 
above emerged in respect of New Zealand’s 2014 general election. It does 
not seek to give any sort of overarching, grand narrative analysis of that 
event and the role that law played in it. Rather, it explores a number of 
issues at a more granular level by explaining how they arose and were 
resolved—as well as what the choice to resolve them in that particular 
way reveals about how elections are conceived of in this country. These 
issues are dealt with under two broad heads. First, the role that the law 
plays in defining political “ins” and “outs” is examined by reference 
to the specific issues of accessing televised leaders’ debates, prisoner 
voting and polling day enrolment. Second, how the law regulates forms 
of electoral campaigning is addressed through looking at the controls 
on polling day behaviour, as well as the restrictions placed on those 
publishing “election advertisements”.
11 A Geddis, Electoral Law in New Zealand: Practice and Policy (2nd ed, 
LexisNexis NZ, Wellington, 2014) at 17. 
123
3 Defining the political “ins” and “outs”
One of law’s key functions in relation to the electoral moment is defining 
who may participate and who is excluded. This separation of the political 
“ins” from “outs”, to co-opt John Hart Ely’s terminology,12 is both 
necessary and fraught with difficulty. It is necessary because elections 
are designed to allow the members of a defined political community—
the nation of New Zealand—to select their political leaders and societal 
lawmakers. That requires establishing some sort of membership 
criteria: who is considered to be a part of that community, and who is 
not?13 Furthermore, the act of voting is predicated upon individuals 
being able to understand their own interests and communicate their 
considered views on who is best placed to serve them as representatives: 
which members of the community are believed to possess the requisite 
capabilities and which are not?14 Casting a ballot also is but one part of 
the broader electoral moment. Prior to the polls opening, extensive and 
often frenzied communicative attempts are made to convince voters to 
support (or not to support) a particular person, party or set of policies. 
Access to this “marketplace of ideas” must then be regulated: which 
sets of voices are allowed to participate in what sorts of communicative 
activities and which are not?
Nevertheless, creating legal rules of inclusion/exclusion involves 
certain inherent problems. Insofar as our constitutional system is 
legitimated by mechanisms requiring the governing to account to the 
governed, excluding some individual or groups from participating in 
the electoral moment removes this most direct method of “checking” 
governmental action. To amend the old adage somewhat, there is no 
point complaining if you cannot vote (or tell people how they should 
vote based on your complaints). Furthermore, as Ely again noted,15 
there is an ever-present risk that the ins may maintain their privileged 
position against challenge from the outs by deliberately crafting rules 
of participation that continue to exclude them. This risk is magnified in 
a system of parliamentary supremacy, where the form and content of 
electoral law ultimately depends upon the views of a majority of those 
elected under such laws. These problems then raise questions as to the 
appropriate institutional response, in particular that of the courts.16 
12 J Ely, Democracy and Distrust: A Theory of Judicial Review (Harvard 
University Press, Cambridge MA, 1980) at 103.
13 See, eg, J Martin, “Political Participation and Electoral Change in 
Nineteenth Century New Zealand” (2005) 57 Pol Sci 39; F Barker and 
K McMillan K, “Constituting the Democratic Public: New Zealand’s 
Extension of National Voting Rights to Non-Citizens” (2014) 12 NZJPIL 
61.
14 See, eg, J Barrett, “The Young, the Senile and the Franchise” [2011] NZ 
Law Rev 1.
15 Ely, above n 12 at 77–88; 102–103.
16 D Bullock, “Electoral Expression With Institutional Bounds: Framing 
Judicial Treatment of Elections in New Zealand” (2011) 42 VUWLR 459 
at 474.
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How actively should they (to once again quote Ely) “polic[e] the process 
of representation”17 by exercising oversight over other institutions’ 
decisions regarding who is (and is not) permitted to participate in the 
electoral moment?
The sorts of matters addressed above emerged in respect of the 2014 
election in three different ways. First of all, the High Court had to 
decide whether to intervene in a television station’s decision to exclude 
a political party leader from one of its pre-election leaders’ debates—a 
decision that takes on particular importance given the very tight 
controls that New Zealand places on accessing the broadcast media for 
electioneering purposes. Second, the courts were invited to scrutinise 
Parliament’s decision to prevent sentenced prisoners from voting in 
three different cases. And third, the generally liberal rules around voter 
enrolment and advance voting conflicted with a statutory prohibition on 
individuals enrolling to vote on polling day itself. Each of these matters 
is discussed in turn.
A Determining who is (and is not) allowed on the broadcast media
New Zealand’s laws governing the use of broadcast media for 
partisan political purposes provide one example of how political ins 
are distinguished from outs.18 The Broadcasting Act 1989 prohibits any 
broadcaster, at any time, from broadcasting an “election programme”,19 
the definition of which encompasses all messages that “encourage or 
persuade (or appear to encourage or persuade) voters to vote for (or not 
to vote for) a candidate or political party”.20 Some specific exceptions 
apply to this blanket ban, thereby allowing certain chosen groups use of 
the broadcast media for partisan political ends. Two of these exceptions 
are particularly important. The first is the limited access provided to 
qualifying political parties by way of the broadcasting allocation,21 which 
enables them to purchase broadcasting time direct from the broadcasters 
to put their election messages before the voting public.22 The Electoral 
Commission is responsible for apportioning this money (as well as 
free time donated by the state-owned broadcasters for the purpose of 
broadcasting opening and closing election addresses) amongst those 
17 Ely, above n 12 at ch 4.
18 See generally Geddis, above n 11 at 195–211.
19 Broadcasting Act 1989, s 70(1). Doing so is an offence punishable by a fine 
of up to $100,000; Broadcasting Act 1989, s 80.
20 Broadcasting Act 1989, s 69(1).
21 Individual candidates also enjoy a limited exception to the blanket ban 
on using the broadcast media for political advertising. A candidate may 
purchase time to broadcast an election programme, so long as it solely 
relates to the promotion of his or her candidacy, and is broadcast in the 
three months prior to the election occurring Broadcasting Act 1989, s 70(2)
(c). However, any such spending by a candidate constitutes an “election 
expense”, and must therefore be counted towards the maximum of $20,000 
that each candidate may spend on advertising his or her campaign: see 
Electoral Act 1993, s 205B. 
22 Broadcasting Act 1989, s 74.
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qualifying political parties that request a share.23 In order to qualify for 
this distribution, a party simply needs to have asked to be included by 
the due date, be registered as a party with the Electoral Commission at 
the time Parliament is dissolved for a general election, and then submit 
a party list of candidates by nomination day.24
The statutory regime thus prevents every group and individual 
wishing to influence the voting public’s choices from directly using the 
broadcast media to do so, other than those political parties that qualify 
for a share of state provided access. The rationale for imposing such 
strict controls lies “in the greater immediacy and impact of television 
and radio advertising”25 as compared to other forms of communication. 
Not only does this regulatory approach effectively preclude broadcasters 
from giving favourable (or unfavourable) direct access to particular 
electoral contestants, it also permits rationing of that access in an effort to 
achieve “fair” electioneering outcomes.26 When the Electoral Commission 
allocates time and money, it is required to consider five factors that 
indicate each party’s relative size and popularity with the voters,27 while 
also making provision for “the need to provide a fair opportunity for each 
political party … to convey its policies to the public by the broadcasting 
of election programmes on television”.28 The concrete result of this 
distributive mechanism is that the larger, established political parties 
receive the lion’s share of the allocation, whilst smaller, newer political 
parties receive far less.29 
23 Broadcasting Act 1989, ss 73, 74A. The Court of Appeal has emphasised 
that the Commission’s allocation decision is not reviewable except where 
“absolutely necessary to determine lawfulness”; Alliance Party v Electoral 
Commission [2010] NZAR 222 (CA) at [43]. See also Bullock, above n 16.
24 The main impediment to a party registering is the requirement it have at 
least 500 current financial members and pay a fee of $500; Electoral Act 
1993, ss 63(2)(c), 63A, 66(1). There were 19 registered parties at the 2014 
election, of which 14 requested and received a share of the broadcasting 
allocation.
25 R (on the application of Animal Defenders International) v Secretary of State for 
Culture, Media and Sport [2008] UKHL 15, at [30]. See also J Rowbottom, 
“Access to the Airwaves and Equality: The Case Against Political 
Advertising on the Broadcast Media”, in K Ewing and S Issacharroff 
(eds), Party Funding and Campaign Financing in International Perspective 
(Hart Publishing, Portland OR, 2005) at 77; A Geddis, “The Press, the 
Media and the ‘Rupert Murdoch Problem’”, in L Ewing, J Rowbottom 
and J Tham (eds), The Funding of Political Parties: Where Now? (Routledge, 
London, 2012) at 129–130.
26 Whether the present legal regime achieves this goal is, however, highly 
contestable; see A Geddis, “Reforming New Zealand’s System of Election 
Broadcast Regulation” (2003) 14 PLR 164 at 176–182.
27 Broadcasting Act 1989, s 75(2)(a)–(e).
28 Broadcasting Act 1989, s 75(2)(f).
29 For example, at the 2014 election the National Party received $1,087,902 
in funding and 16’30” of free broadcast time. The four smallest parties 
that applied each received $34,729 in funding and 1’05” of free broadcast 
time.
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For this reason, the second exception to the ban on using the broadcast 
media for partisan political ends becomes very important for electoral 
contestants. The general statutory prohibition does not apply to “the 
broadcasting, in relation to an election, of news or of comments or of 
current affairs programmes.”30 Starved of meaningful direct access to the 
broadcast media to communicate their electoral messages, such indirect 
“free” coverage represents the smaller, newer parties primary means of 
reaching the voters via television or radio. However, decisions as to what 
or who is newsworthy lie with individual reporters and editors in each 
media organisation. These individuals thus are able to decide who is 
included in the electoral narrative and who is left out of it, at least as far 
as the broadcast media are concerned. Reporters and editors then operate 
under the lightest of statutory direction; broadcasters are obligated to 
“present significant points of view” if discussing “controversial issues 
of public importance”,31 but are under no requirement to include any 
particular individual or party’s views as a part of any given news story. 
In contrast to the tightly controlled direct access regime, allowing lightly 
constrained editorial freedom to determine how election-related issues 
are reported to the public is considered to be an important component of 
the sort of vibrant, diverse and informative communicative environment 
that underpins a legitimate election process.
Editorial discretion nevertheless presents a particular problem in 
respect of the party leaders’ debates that television and radio stations 
hold prior to each election, as illustrated in the case of Craig v MediaWorks 
Ltd.32 This decision followed the exclusion of Colin Craig, the leader of 
the Conservative Party, from a televised debate on TV 3 between the 
leaders of so-called minor parties. Mr Craig sought an interim injunction 
preventing the debate from proceeding without him, arguing that the 
basis for his exclusion—that his party did not win a seat at the last 
election—was “unreasonable” in a Wednesbury sense. He noted that 
the Act Party, which was included in the debate, also had no current 
representation in Parliament and that recent opinion polls showed his 
party was registering greater public support than four of the invited 
parties. This injunction application proved successful, although the 
reasons for granting it were minimal at best. In his oral judgment, 
Gilbert J found it was “arguable” both that the matter was reviewable 
due to the public interest involved33 and that TV3’s basis for selecting 
participants in the debate had failed to consider relevant factors (and 
so could “arguably” be unreasonable).34 Having found that Mr Craig 
had an at least arguable case,35 Gilbert J then considered whether the 
30 Broadcasting Act 1989, s 70(3).
31 Broadcasting Act 1989 (NZ), s 4(1)(d). For a discussion of these obligations 
in relation to elections, see Bullock, n 16 at 480–484.
32 [2014] NZHC 1875. The decision in this case is discussed in N Taefi, “The 
uninvited guest” [2014] NZLJ 364.
33 Craig v MediaWorks [2014] NZHC 1875 at [7].
34 Craig v MediaWorks [2014] NZHC 1875 at [10].
35 Craig v MediaWorks [2014] NZHC 1875 at [11].
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balance of convenience warranted granting the injunction sought. The 
consequences for TV3 were dismissed as minimal; it would, at worst, 
have to find a larger studio in which to host the debate.36 By comparison, 
the potential harm to Mr Craig’s campaign (and thus, assumedly, the 
election contest generally) was assessed as being great as “the public 
would gain the impression that MediaWorks has determined that Mr 
Craig does not ‘make the cut’ …”.37
Given the scant justification for granting Mr Craig his injunction 
(thus compelling TV3 to either include him in the debate or abandon it 
altogether), the case’s most interesting aspect is that it keeps alive the 
precedent set in Dunne v CanWest TV Works Ltd.38 Decided prior to the 
2005 election, Dunne resulted in an injunction positively requiring TV3 to 
include two minor party leaders in a leaders’ debate. In making that order, 
Ronald Young J concluded that a broadcaster’s decision to host a debate 
that could have an influence on the election contest’s outcome created a 
public duty to ensure that participants are not chosen in an arbitrary and 
unreasonable fashion.39 However, the basis for the decision in Dunne had 
been somewhat questioned in two subsequent cases,40 where the courts 
instead focused both on the rights of media organisations to make their 
own editorial judgments41 and the difficulties involved with judicial 
oversight of such decisions.42 Those cases raised the possibility that the 
decision in Dunne was sui generis in nature, or at least restricted to only 
the most “exceptional and compelling cases”.43 
The ruling in Craig demonstrates that the Courts are still prepared to 
intervene to overturn a broadcaster’s decision where it appears to be 
applying the selection criteria for a party leader’s debate “unreasonably”. 
The judiciary’s message to broadcasters thus appears to be that if they 
are going to hold an election-related debate with participants chosen 
according to particular objective measuring stick, they then must make 
sure they use it consistently. Of course, nothing in these decisions 
requires broadcasters to hold such debates in the first place. Equally, if 
a broadcaster were to eschew any pretence at objectivity and instead 
invite only those participants that the broadcaster’s political journalists 
36 Craig v MediaWorks [2014] NZHC 1875 at [13]–[14].
37 Craig v MediaWorks [2014] NZHC 1875 at [10].
38 [2005] NZAR 577 (HC).
39 Dunne v CanWest TV Works Ltd [2005] NZAR 577 (HC) at [43].
40 Mangu v Television New Zealand Ltd [2006] NZAR 299 (HC); Alp v Television 
New Zealand Ltd [2011] NZAR 515 (HC). The decision also was subject to 
some academic criticism; see D Knight, “Dunne v CanWest TVWorks Ltd: 
Enhancing or Undermining the Democratic and Constitutional Balance?” 
(2005) 21 NZULR 711; C Morris, “A Dunne Deal? Politicians, the Media 
and the Courts” (2005) 57 Pol Sci 55; M Taggart, “Review: Administrative 
Law” [2006] NZ Law Rev 75 at 91–96.
41 Mangu v Television New Zealand Ltd [2006] NZAR 299 (HC) at [20]; Alp v 
Television New Zealand Ltd [2011] NZAR 515 (HC) at [40].
42 Mangu v Television New Zealand Ltd [2006] NZAR 299 (HC) at [51].
43 Alp v Television New Zealand Ltd [2011] NZAR 515 (HC) at [40].
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subjectively believe (based on their personal experience and judgment) 
are likely to be elected at the forthcoming election, it is difficult to see 
how a court could second-guess such a decision.44 However, making 
such explicit predictions about the expected success or otherwise of 
individual parties would open a broadcaster up to allegations of bias, 
so it is understandable why they are loathe to do so. As broadcasters are 
thus likely to continue to issue invites to debate participants based on 
indicia such as opinion polling, past electoral success and the like, the 
courts will retain a role as final overseers of the guest list.
B Barring prisoners from the ballot box
Representative democracy’s core commitment is that all members of 
society have a basic, equal right to take part in selecting those who will 
make the laws for that society. Even though each person in reality has 
differing capacities and qualities—some are more intelligent than others, 
some have received more education than others, some are wealthier than 
others, etc—individuals should still be treated as presumptive equals 
when it comes to participating in the electoral process.45  In the New 
Zealand context, this commitment is reflected in the current legal rule 
that most citizens (as well as permanent residents)46 who have attained 
the age of 18 are legally entitled to enrol to vote,47 while every validly 
enrolled elector is legally entitled to cast one (but only one)48 ballot at 
each election.49 Nevertheless, a number of exclusions apply to the legal 
right to enrol to vote (and thus cast a ballot at election time). In addition 
to the obvious—those who are neither citizens nor permanent residents 
and those under 18—these exclusions are: 
 • New Zealand citizens or permanent residents who have never lived in 
New Zealand for 12 months continuously;50
 • New Zealand citizens who have lived outside of New Zealand for more 
than three years continuously (or permanent residents who have done 
so for more than 12 months);51
 • Persons convicted of a criminal offence who are subsequently 
compulsorally detained in hospital for treatment of a mental illness for 
44 See Mangu v Television New Zealand Ltd [2006] NZAR 299 (HC) at [66] (“If 
the Court is to interfere with the exercise of freedom of expression by the 
media, it should only do so where it is reasonably sure of the factual basis 
underpinning the application for restraint”); Alp v Television New Zealand 
Ltd [2011] NZAR 515 (HC) at [48]. 
45 See R Dahl, Democracy and Its Critics (Yale University Press, New Haven, 
CT, 1989) at 83–105; R Dahl, On Democracy (Yale University Press, New 
Haven, CT, 1998) at 63–80.
46 A permanent resident is a person lawfully in New Zealand who is not 
subject to any immigration restriction; Electoral Act 1993, s 73.
47 Electoral Act 1993, s 74(1). 
48 Electoral Act 1993, s 215.
49 Electoral Act 1993, s 60. See also New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990, s 12.
50 Electoral Act 1993, s 74(1).
51 Electoral Act 1993, s 80(1)(a) and (b).
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a period of three years or more;52
 • Individuals whose names appear on the “corrupt practices list”;53
 • Persons detained in a prison facility under a sentence of imprisonment 
imposed after 10 December 2010.54
Two of these exceptions attracted some attention during the 2014 
campaign. The first is the effective disenfranchisement of New Zealand 
citizens who have resided outside of New Zealand for three years 
or more. This issue was highlighted by a group of expatriate New 
Zealanders living in Australia who claimed to be forming an “Expat 
Party” with the primary policy objective of removing the relevant 
disqualification provision from the Electoral Act 1993.55 In the end, the 
promised organisation did not register with the Electoral Commission, 
and no more was heard from it. 
The second issue to gain attention was the disenfranchisement of 
sentenced prisoners whilst they are incarcerated. Some background 
context is necessary here. Varying restrictions have applied to 
incarcerated prisoners’ right to vote over time.56 There has been an 
ongoing dispute between those who view voting as a fundamental 
right that all adult members of the community (including prisoners) 
possess and those who believe that criminal offending serious enough 
to warrant a jail sentence represents a sufficiently grevious breach of 
the social contract to warrant disenfranchisement.57 The latest iteration 
of this debate took the form of the Electoral (Disqualification of Sentenced 
Prisoners) Amendment Act 2010, which amended the Electoral Act to 
disqualify all future sentenced prisoners from enrolling to vote while 
they remain incarcerated. Previously this sanction had applied only to 
those individuals serving sentences of three or more years imprisonment. 
Parliament’s change to the law was made over the top of the Attorney 
General’s warning under s 7 of the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 
that the measure represented an unjustified limited on the right to vote, 
primarily due to its largely arbitrary effects.58 The process by which the 
52 Electoral Act 1993, s 80(1)(c).
53 Electoral Act 1993, s 80(1)(e). A person is placed on this list for a period 
of three years if found by a court to have committed such practices 
(essentially serious offences against the electoral process itself); Electoral 
Act 1993, s 100(1).
54 Electoral Act 1993, s 80(1)(d). This provision also encompasses any prisoner 
currently serving a term of imprisonment of more than 3 years that was 
imposed prior to 10 December 2010.
55 See TV3, “New Expats party plans to contest election”, 11 February 2014, 
http://www.3news.co.nz/politics/new-expats-party-plans-to-contest-
election-2014021106.
56 G Robins, “The Rights of Prisoners to Vote: A Review of Prisoner 
Disenfranchisement in New Zealand” 2006 4 NZJPIL 165 at 166–171.
57 See Geddis, above n 11 at 70–72.
58 C Finlayson, Report of the Attorney-General under the New Zealand Bill of 
Rights Act 1990 on the Electoral (Disqualification of Convicted Prisoners) 
Amendment Bill (J4, published by order of the House of Representatives, 
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law change passed through the various stages of parliamentary debate 
and scrutiny also was subject to criticism.59 Nevertheless, the consequence 
of its passage seemed clear: any sentenced prisoner who is behind bars 
on election day may not legally be enrolled as an elector, and so cannot 
legally cast a vote.
In the run-up to the 2014 election, however, a number of prisoners led 
by Mr Arthur Taylor brought a series of legal challenges to this legislation. 
Amongst the various grounds for disputing its application, three were 
particularly important. First, the prisoners alleged that the enactment 
containing the disenfranchisement provision was invalid law as it had 
not been passed in accordance with the process required by s 268 of the 
Electoral Act, which serves to entrench certain aspects of New Zealand’s 
electoral laws. Second, they claimed that the disenfranchisement 
provision ought to be read using s 6 of the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 
as applying only to those prisoners who were serving the “punishment” 
component of their sentence (ie who were not yet eligible for parole). 
And third, they argued that the law change was inconsistent with the 
New Zealand Bill of Rights Act and should be declared as such by the 
courts. These claims were made in three separate actions: one seeking 
general declarations from the High Court;60 a second that sought 
specific injunctive relief in respect of the 2014 election;61 and a third that 
challenged the outcome of that election in two particular electorates.62
The latter two challenges proved unsuccessful. While Ellis J 
apparently was quite sympathetic to Mr Taylor’s criticisms of the 
prisoner disenfranchisement legislation—her Honour spends 10 
paragraphs recounting these at length63 before describing the measure 
as “constitutionally objectionable”64—her Honour refused the requested 
injunctive relief allowing prisoners to enrol and vote at the 2014 election. 
In short, Ellis J found the legislation was properly enacted65 and clear in 
its intent,66 meaning that there was no basis to even consider whether 
an injunction ought to be granted:
Parliament has (for now) spoken. And what Parliament has said is that 
no prisoner who is serving a sentence of imprisonment and who happens 
to be incarcerated on 20 September 2014 may vote in this year’s general 
election. The applicants therefore have no position to preserve and the 
Court is unable to intervene.67
2010) at [15].
59 See A Geddis, “Prisoner Voting and Rights Deliberation: How New 
Zealand’s Parliament Failed” [2011] NZLR 443 at 462–467.
60 Taylor v Attorney General [2014] NZHC 1630.
61 Taylor v Attorney General [2014] NZHC 2225.
62 Taylor v Davis [2014] NZHC 2648; Taylor v Key [2015] NZHC 722.
63 Taylor v Attorney General [2014] NZHC 2225 at [6]–[16].
64 Taylor v Attorney General [2014] NZHC 2225 at [80].
65 Taylor v Attorney General [2014] NZHC 2225 at [74]–[78].
66 Taylor v Attorney General [2014] NZHC 2225 at [30].
67 Taylor v Attorney General [2014] NZHC 2225 at [80]. The Court of Appeal 
subsequently refused leave for an urgent appeal from this decision, Taylor 
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Similarly, Mr Taylor’s attempt to challenge the election results in both 
of the electorates of Helensville and Te Tai Tokerau by way of electoral 
petitions also foundered. With respect to Te Tai Tokerau, the required 
$1000 as security for costs was not paid into court in time, leading the 
High Court to dismiss the petition at a preliminary stage.68 The petition 
challenging the result in Helensville was heard but was rejected by 
the Court on the grounds that Mr Taylor did not possess the requisite 
standing to lodge the petition (because even if prisoners were permitted 
to cast a vote, he could not have been enrolled in the electorate in 
question).69
That then left Mr Taylor’s third action in play. It survived a strike out 
application, in which the Crown argued that the High Court has no 
jurisdiction to formally declare legislation to be incompatible with the 
New Zealand Bill of Rights Act. Justice Brown rejected this proposition,70 
but also warned that “my view of the Court’s current jurisdiction to 
grant declarations of inconsistency is: in theory ‘yes’ but in practice 
‘no’.”71 In particular, Brown J feared that such a declaration could upset 
the principle of comity between the legislative and judicial branches,72 
especially in situations where the Attorney-General already has drawn 
Parliament’s attention to the rights consequences of proposed legislation 
by way of a section 7 notice.73 However, in his substantive ruling on the 
application, Heath J rejected this concern and issued the sought-after 
relief:74
The purpose of a formal declaration is to draw to the attention of the New 
Zealand public that Parliament has enacted legislation inconsistent with a 
fundamental right. It does so in a manner that is more accessible to them 
than a report to Parliament by the Attorney-General. Again, this is a matter 
of function. When reporting under s 7, the Attorney’s responsibility is 
to Parliament. When determining questions of public law, this Court’s 
responsibility is to all New Zealanders. 
Acting on that responsibility, Heath J formally declared that: “Section 80(1)
(d) of the Electoral Act 1993 (as amended by the Electoral (Disqualification 
of Sentenced Prisoners) Amendment Act 2010) is inconsistent with the 
right to vote affirmed and guaranteed in s 12(a) of the New Zealand 
Bill of Rights Act 1990, and cannot be justified under s 5 of that Act.”75
Justice Heath’s view in the High Court thus mirrors that of the judiciary 
v Attorney General, unreported, Court of Appeal, 16 September 2014, 
CA509/2014.
68 Taylor v Davis [2014] NZHC 2648 at [27].
69 Taylor v Key [2015] NZHC 722 at [83]–[86]; Electoral Act 1993 (NZ) s 230(1).
70 Taylor v Attorney General [2014] NZHC 1630 at [82].
71 Taylor v Attorney General [2014] NZHC 1630 at [83].
72 Taylor v Attorney General [2014] NZHC 1630 at [79]–[81].
73 Taylor v Attorney General [2014] NZHC 1630 at [85]–[86].
74 Taylor v Attorney General [2015] NZHC 1706 at [77].
75 Taylor v Attorney General [2015] NZHC 1706 at [78].
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Australia,76 Canada,77 South Africa78 and the Republic of Ireland,79 as 
well as in Europe generally.80 In each of these jurisdictions, courts have 
concluded that prisoner disenfranchisement provisions unjustifiably 
limit the individual right to vote. By formally noting that the Electoral 
Act s 80(1)(d) also has this effect, Heath J has drilled a hole in the tall 
fence that traditionally protects the reasons for Parliament’s decisions 
on electoral matters from scrutiny by the judicial gaze. It now remains 
to be seen what, if anything, Parliament chooses to do in response to his 
pointed remarks about its actions.81
C Elector registration, advance votes and special votes
As noted, before an individual may cast a valid vote at election time, 
she or he must be legally entitled to enrol as an elector and then actually 
have enrolled (or applied to enrol).82 New Zealand’s law on enrolling and 
subsequently obtaining a ballot is comparatively liberal. First, there is 
no requirement to provide any proof of identity when enrolling to vote. 
It can be done simply by filling in, signing and returning by hand or by 
post a form that is made widely and freely available.83 Second, no proof 
of identity is required when requesting a ballot paper. All an individual 
must do is give (or affirm by word or action) their name to the polling 
place officials.84 And third, voters have a wide time frame in which to 
cast their votes. While “polling day” commonly is viewed as the point 
at which the electorate exercises its collective choice as to who will 
govern, in 2014 the Electoral Commission was required to make polling 
places available in each electorate some 17 days before polling day.85 
Following changes made in 2010,86 during this time period any enrolled 
elector is permitted to receive and cast their ballot at these places just 
as if it were polling day. Because casting an “advance vote” is now so 
straightforward, doing so proved to be very popular in 2014; by polling 
day some 717,579 ballot papers had been received, amounting to 29.7 
per cent of the total votes cast.87
This regulatory regime contains two points of note. First, it reflects a 
general principle that voting should be made easily and freely accessible. 
76  Roach v Electoral Commissioner (2007) 233 CLR 162.
77 Sauvé v Canada (A-G) (No 2) (2002) 218 DLR (4th) 577.
78 Minister of Home Affairs v National Institute for Crime Prevention and the 
Reintegration of Offenders (NICRO) 2005 (3) SA 280 (CC).
79 Breathnach v Ireland [2001] 3 IR 230 (SC).
80 Hirst v The United Kingdom (No 2) (2006) 42 EHRR 41 (Grand Chamber, 
ECHR); Frodl v Austria [2010] ECHR 20201/04; Scoppola (No 3) v Italy [2011] 
ECHR 126/05; Greens v The United Kingdom [2010] ECHR 60041/08.
81 The Crown has appealed Heath J’s decision to the Court of Appeal.  The 
resolution of that appeal was not available at the time of writing.
82 Electoral Act 1993, s 60.
83 Electoral Act 1993, s 83(1).
84 Electoral Act 1993, ss 167(2)&(2A).
85 Electoral Regulations 1996, reg 19(2).
86 Electoral (Finance Reform and Advance Voting) Amendment Act 2010, s 42.
87 This figure compares to the 334,558 advance votes cast in 2011.
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Although this is a relatively (but not, as shall be seen, completely) 
uncontroversial position in the New Zealand context,88 it is not the case 
in other jurisdictions where various identification requirements must be 
met before a voter may receive a ballot.89 Such requirements are putatively 
imposed in order to protect the integrity of the electoral process, by 
limiting the possibility of voting fraud.90 They also may have partisan 
political motivations, as the groups most likely to be disadvantaged 
by restrictions on ballot access tend to support one side of the political 
spectrum. Consequently, overseas rules on voter identification have been 
the subject of often-intense debate in both legislative and judicial arenas.91
In comparison, there have been relatively few calls for requiring New 
Zealand electors to show identification before receiving a ballot paper. 
Concerns over voter fraud largely are addressed during the process of 
scrutinising the rolls prior to the official vote count.92 To summarise, each 
elector is given an individually numbered ballot (which is recorded next 
to the elector’s name), allowing any cases of “double voting” or votes 
cast by improperly registered persons to be remedied by removing the 
invalid ballot from the final tally.93 In spite of this safeguard, a faint 
echo of overseas disputes was heard in the run-up to the 2014 election. 
A proposal to amend the Electoral Act to permit EasyVote cards94 to be 
used as proof that an elector had received a ballot paper was rejected by 
Parliament’s Justice and Electoral Committee, which feared it “would 
in effect lower the threshold for casting a vote, increasing the potential 
for fraud and harming the integrity of the voting process.”95 Instead, 
the Committee amended the Bill to positively require all electors to 
“verbally give or verbally confirm” their name before receiving a ballot. 
Labour Party MPs subsequently attacked this change as “a retrograde 
measure” with partisan overtones as it could impede certain groups from 
participating at the polls.96 It therefore passed into law on a party-line 
88 See Justice and Electoral Committee, Inquiry into the 2011 General Election, 
AJHR I.7A, April 2013, pp 19–33.
89 See F Shaffer and T Wang, “Is Everyone Else Doing It? Indiana’s Voter 
Identification Law in International Perspective” (2009) 3 Harv L & Pol’y 
Rev 397.
90 L Minnite, “Voter Identification Laws: The Controversy over Voter Fraud”, 
in M Streb (ed), Law and Election Politics: The Rules of the Game (2nd ed, 
Routledge, Abingdon, 2013) at 88.
91 See R Pildes, “Elections”, in M Rosen and A Sajó (eds), The Oxford Handbook 
of Comparative Constitutional Law (OUP, Oxford, 2012) at 535–537. 
92 Geddis, above n 11 at 237–240.
93 Electoral Act 1993, s 176.
94 The Electoral Commission mails EasyVote cards to all enrolled electors 
prior to polling day. They contain information that allows polling officials 
to quickly and easily locate an elector’s details on the printed electoral 
roll.
95 Justice and Electoral Committee, Report on the Electoral Amendment Bill 
(149-2), 18 December 2013, at 3.
96 See, eg, the comments made by the Hon Phil Goff during the Committee 
Stage debate:
Law and New Zealand’s 2014 election campaign
Otago Law Review134 (2015) Vol 14 No 1
vote of 65-55, with the governing parties supporting the measure and 
opposition parties registering their dissatisfaction. Whether this episode 
represents an end to the previous consensus over voting access issues 
remains to be seen.
The second point of note is that New Zealand’s electoral enrolment 
regime contains something of an anomaly. Anyone who is not registered 
as an elector (or, who is unsure if he or she is properly registered) can 
apply to do so at any point during the 17-day-long advance voting stage 
simply by filling out and submitting the relevant form. Having done 
so, she or he immediately may cast a ballot in the form of a “special 
vote”.97 However, in order to cast a valid ballot, prospective voters must 
be registered as electors (or have applied to register as electors) before 
polling day itself.98 There is no provision for polling day enrolment 
in New Zealand. Consequently, at every election a not-insignificant 
number of special votes are rejected because those casting them are 
not properly enrolled to vote. In 2014, this amounted to some 27,467 
ballots; or around 1 per cent of the total valid votes cast. Furthermore, 
these disallowed votes are unevenly distributed across electorates. The 
highest numbers are found in the Maori electorates99 and those South 
Auckland seats with a large proportion of voters who are from Maori or 
Pacifika communities.100 In contrast, the lowest numbers of disallowed 
votes tend to occur in the South Island rural seats, which have a quite 
different ethnic makeup.101 
In the absence of a clear explanation, we must assume that the 
Republican Tea Party faction has started to infiltrate the thinking 
of the National Party. The EasyVote card, as the Minister said in 
the first reading debate, makes it easier for people to participate 
and it improves the efficiency of the system. Does the National 
Party not want more people to participate? Does the National 
Party realise that more people participating counts against the 
self-interest of that party? Is the National Party putting the self-
interest of its electoral benefit ahead of the right of people and the 
encouragement and promotion of people to perform their civic 
duty of casting a vote? 
 NZPD, 11 March 2014, Volume 697; Page 16476.
97 Any person whose name does not appear on an electoral district’s printed 
electoral roll must cast a “special vote”; Electoral Act 1993, s 61. This 
requires the voter to complete and sign a witnessed declaration indicating 
“the ground or grounds on which that person is claiming a special vote”, 
Electoral Regulations 1996, reg 25(1).
98 Electoral Act 1993, s 60(b)(ii).
99 A total of 4911 special votes were disallowed across the 7 Maori electorates 
because the person casting it was not properly enrolled, which equates 
to about 3.3 percent of the valid votes cast in those electoral districts.
100 For example, Mangere, Manukau East and Manerewa each saw over 1000 
special votes disallowed because the person casting it was not properly 
enrolled, which equates to about 4 percent of the valid votes cast in each 
electoral district.
101 Of the ten electoral districts that had less than 200 special votes disallowed 
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One possible reason for this discrepancy can be swiftly discounted. 
The Electoral Commission does not act in a haphazard or inconsistent 
fashion when deciding whether to allow or disallow special votes. This 
possibility was explored after the 2014 election in relation to the result 
in the Te Tai Tokerau electorate, which had the highest proportion of 
rejected special votes in the country.102 A losing candidate, Mr Hone 
Harawira, sought a judicial recount of the votes in order to ensure that the 
Electoral Commission was acting in a proper and lawful manner.103 After 
a sample of the disallowed special votes were checked in front of a District 
Court Judge and scrutineers from both the challenger and the successful 
candidate, all involved accepted that the Commission had acted as the 
Electoral Act requires.104 Consequently, the unequal effect of the existing 
rules is not due to how they are applied by the administrating agency, but 
rather because of how different social groups respond to them. Simply 
put, Maori and Pacifika people disproportionately fail to meet the law’s 
requirement to enroll before voting, meaning that they effectively are 
disenfranchised in greater numbers than other New Zealanders.
Allowing individuals to both enroll and vote on polling day itself 
represents one obvious and apparently simple, albeit partial,105 response 
to this problem. Parliament’s Justice and Electoral Committee considered 
this proposal as a part of its inquiry into the 2011 general election. It 
noted that research showed the move would increase enrolment and 
voter turnout rates, but that:
[The Electoral Commission argued] that it might act as a disincentive to 
enrolling before election day, and would require more staff and resources 
on election day. It could also delay the official count, as voters enrolling 
on election day would need to cast special votes, which are much more 
time-consuming to process than routine votes, and registrars would need 
to complete such voters’ enrolment before their special votes could be 
validated.106 
because the person casting it was not properly enrolled, eight were in the 
South Island and seven were predominantly rural seats.
102 The 947 special votes disallowed in that electoral district because the 
person casting it was not properly enrolled equated to some 7.94% of the 
total valid votes cast.
103 Te Tai Tokerau Recount, unreported, District Court, Kaitaia, CIV 2014-029-
126, 16 October 2014.
104 Te Tai Tokerau Recount, unreported, District Court, Kaitaia, CIV 2014-029-
126, 16 October 2014 at [39].
105 It is only a partial solution as it appears that a number of voters remain 
confused over the basic requirement to enroll. See, eg, Memorandum of 
Judge TJ Broadmore, Te Tai Tokerau Recount, unreported, District Court, 
Kaitaia, CIV 2014-029-126, 20 November 2014 at [9]: “I consider it likely 
that some Maori voters thought that by completing the special vote 
declaration, they were both being enrolled to vote and voting. I consider 
it likely that voters on the general roll who made special declaration votes 
on Election Day had the same belief.”
106 Justice and Electoral Committee, Inquiry into the 2011 General Election, 
AJHR I.7A, April 2013 at 11.
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Of course, since this advice was provided, the number of advance votes 
cast has more than doubled, with a corresponding fall in the number of 
electors casting a ballot on polling day itself. As such, the Justice and 
Committee’s conclusion on this issue from 2013 ought to be revisited: 
“We accept the commission’s advice, but believe that we should continue 
to monitor this issue. In principle, any mechanism that allows these 
voters to be enfranchised should be encouraged.”107 Principle should 
take priority over administrative concerns, especially as those concerns 
are becoming less pressing as the voting process expands to encompass 
a wider time period.
4 Regulating forms of participation
After the participants in the electoral process have been identified, 
questions still arise as to how they may participate. That is to say, the 
law’s regulation of forms of electoral campaigning is an important part 
of structuring the electoral contest. In part, such regulation is concerned 
with setting the ground rules for a generally accepted “fair” or “clean” 
political competition. It reflects notions of what forms of behaviour or 
kinds of messages are acceptable as a means of persuading electors 
to support one candidate or party over another. In the New Zealand 
context, it also reflects cultural commitments to ensuring a measure of 
participant equality by controlling the way wealth can be used to pay 
for electoral advertising. But legal regulation of electoral participation in 
New Zealand is not only concerned with such instrumentalist matters. It 
also seeks to shape the very experience of casting a ballot. By restricting 
the way that electors may be influenced as they go to the polling places, 
the law seeks to create a zone of calm repose. Not only is this intended 
to inculcate a mood of calm reflectiveness on the part of the elector, but 
also it gives polling day a very particular feel. This section first examines 
these controls on polling day behaviour and the problems that they 
face, before discussing two important cases that clarify the legal rules 
governing the publication of election advertisements.
A Enforcing polling day decorum
Section 197 of the Electoral Act contains provisions designed to eliminate 
any effort to sway voters’ intentions in close proximity to the act of voting. 
There is a general prohibition, punishable by a fine of up to $20,000, on 
“in any way interfer[ing] with any elector, either in the polling place or 
while the elector is on the way to the polling place with the intention of 
influencing the elector or advising the elector as to the elector’s vote.”108 
Furthermore, on polling day itself it is an offence to engage in a broad 
107 Justice and Electoral Committee, Inquiry into the 2011 General Election, 
AJHR I.7A, April 2013 at 11.
108 Electoral Act 1993, s 197(1)(a). Note that this prohibition applies at all 
times, so covers activities involving advance voting as well as polling 
day itself.
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range of behaviours, including:109
 • in or in view or hearing of any public place holding or taking 
part in any demonstration or procession having direct or indirect 
reference to the poll by any means whatsoever;
 • making any statement having direct or indirect reference to the 
poll by means of “any loudspeaker or public address apparatus 
or cinematograph or television apparatus”;
 • printing or distributing or delivering to any person any card or 
paper (whether or not it is an imitation ballot paper) that contains 
the names of the candidates or the parties or any of them.
The most relevant of these provisions for contemporary New Zealand 
elections is found in the Electoral Act’s s 197(1)(g), which makes it an 
offence to: 
exhibit in or in view of any public place, or publish, or distribute, or 
broadcast,—
(i) any statement advising or intended or likely to influence any elector 
as to the candidate or party for whom the elector should or should not 
vote; or
(ii) any statement advising or intended or likely to influence any elector 
to abstain from voting; or
(iii) any party name, emblem, slogan, or logo; or
(iv) any ribbons, streamers, rosettes, or items of a similar nature in party 
colours.
This prohibition forces candidates and their supporters to engage in 
a frantic election-eve rush to take down all the various hoardings, 
billboards and posters that were so carefully erected over the previous 
weeks of campaigning. What is more, the Electoral Act empowers 
returning officers to “remove or obliterate” any remaining campaign 
material left in public view on polling day.110
At first blush it might appear that the purpose of these regulatory 
measures is to prevent voters being illegitimately pressured into voting 
for some particular candidate or party. However, a separate offence 
provision deems the use of such “undue influence” to compel a voter to be 
a corrupt practice that is punishable by up to two years imprisonment.111 
Consequently, the above provisions instead are intended to prohibit 
almost all forms of electioneering activity, no matter how mild or 
innocuous, as voters go to the polls. The reason for such rules cannot 
then be concerns that voters will somehow be intimidated or coerced into 
voting one way or the other, but rather a desire to inculcate a particular 
kind of mood or voting experience. Graeme Orr notes the linkage 
109 Electoral Act 1993, s 197(1)(b)–(i).
110 Electoral Act 1993, s 198.
111 Electoral Act 1993, ss 218, 224(1).
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between 19th Century moves to adopt the secret ballot and broader efforts 
to cloak the electoral moment with decorum,112 citing one contemporary 
observer as rhapsodising that with the introduction of secret balloting:
An elector … instead of running a desperate gauntlet through corruption, 
drunkenness, violence, and uproar, walks, as it were in an even frame of 
mind, through a smooth, private avenue to discharge the political duties 
of citizenship. In a contested election under the ballot there is nothing 
to indicate the existence of tumult or angry passion – nothing to disturb 
the ordinary current of business – nothing to superinduce discord in 
neighbourly relations – nothing to provoke intestine broils; everything 
proceeds with the same tranquil placidity as if the community was 
undergoing a trying operation under the influence of chloroform, waking 
up to consciousness on the declaration of the poll.113
As such, provisions such as s 197 “are best seen as an attempt to 
encourage a calm repose in any electors who remain undecided on some 
questions and to erect an aesthetic of quietude consonant with the secret 
ballot reforms … .”114  
Of course, this aesthetic choice in the mode of legal regulation comes 
at the cost of imposing quite draconian (albeit short-lived) restrictions 
on freedom of expression. Merely walking down the street on polling 
day while wearing a T-shirt emblasoned with a political party logo is 
an offence that could attract a fine of $20,000. Furthermore, attempts to 
enforce decorum upon electoral proceedings face at least two significant 
contemporary challenges. The first results from the growing popularity 
of advance voting. As noted above, in 2014 nearly thirty per cent of the 
total ballots were cast before polling day began. Section 197’s various 
prohibitions on polling day activities did not apply during this seventeen 
day long advance voting period; only the general offence of interfering 
with voters in, or on their way to, the polling place. Therefore, in 2014 
some 3-in-10 voters cast their ballots even as the full hurly-burly of the 
election campaign raged around them unabated, while the rest did so 
during the enforced quietude of polling day itself. It seems odd that 
different rules would apply to each set of votes. Furthermore, s.197(1)
(a)’s generic injunction against interfering with voters while on their 
way to cast their votes is difficult to interpret and apply in an advance 
voting situation while campaigning is still in full swing. It appears that 
its application in 2014 largely was at the whim of individual polling 
place managers, who exercised their own discretion as to what sort of 
election-related activities and advertising was permitted in the vicinity 
of the voting booths. 
The rise of social media poses a second challenge to legal attempts 
at purging electioneering from polling day.  Although s 197(1)(g) was 
enacted in a pre-internet era, the Electoral Act’s definition of “publish” 
112 Orr, above n 9 at 100–104.
113 W Kelly, Life in Victoria or Victoria in 1853, and Victoria in 1858 (Lowden, 
1977) p 318, quoted in Orr, above n 9 at 101.
114 Orr, above n 9 at 119.
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encompasses “bring[ing] to the notice of a person in any manner”, 
including through “disseminating by means of the Internet or any 
other electronic medium”.115 Consequently, the Electoral Commission 
considers that polling day communications such as tweets or updated 
posts on sites like Facebook or Instagram that “advise or [are] intended 
or likely to influence any elector as to the candidate or party for whom 
the elector should or should not vote” breach the Act. Following the 2014 
campaign, it referred 24 such messages to the Police for investigation and 
possible prosecution. These referrals included tweets sent by sporting 
personalities Israel Dagg, Jonah Lomu and Eric Murray.116 However, such 
enforcement action appears to be the equivalent of sticking a finger in 
a crumbling dike. Not only is social media culture an immediate one in 
which users expect to be able to share everything and anything that they 
may be doing or thinking, but research indicates that “doing so represents 
an event with intrinsic value, in the same way as with primary rewards 
such as food and sex.” 117 Attempts to restrict the use of such media 
are thus always likely to be limited in their success. What is more, the 
purpose of such restrictions is unclear. Even if it is still thought desirable 
to impose a measure of physical decorum on polling day, why should 
that choice extend to the social media sphere? 
Consequently, the time is nigh for a thorough re-examination of New 
Zealand’s rules around polling day electioneering. It is not immediately 
obvious that a historical preference for enforced decorum still ought to 
trump the rights of those who wish to continue to express their partisan 
preferences right up until the polling places close. And even if this 
preference is thought to provide sufficient reason to limit expressive 
rights in theory, it is not clear how it can be actualised in a context where 
not only does voting extend over a considerably longer period of time but 
communication now takes place in ways quite different to the Victorian 
era when the rules first were developed. A better approach would be to 
adopt the Australian example of creating a buffer zone around polling 
places in which electioneering activities are prohibited at all times that 
voting is taking place, but outside of which no special rules apply on 
polling day.
B Defining “electoral advertisements”
A range of legal controls and requirements apply to any person who 
publishes an “election advertisement”. All such advertisements 
115 Electoral Act 1993, s 3D(a)(viii).
116 The referred messages read “Just voted for @johnkeypm and the National 
party all the best for tonight #blueallday #National”; “@johnkeypm 
All the best Tonight Get in there everyone your last chance to vote and 
grow NZ go “National” #vote2014nz”; and “Get out & vote NZ! Plenty 
of time left #decision14 Don’t worry @johnkeypm you got my vote! 
#sportfunding”.
117 D Tamir and J Mitchell, “Disclosing information about the self is 
intrinsically rewarding” (2012) 109 Proceedings of the National Academy 
of Sciences 8038 at 8041.
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published at any time must include on them the name and address of 
the “promoter” responsible for the publication.118 Additionally, limits 
apply to spending on election advertisements during the (usually) 
three-month long “regulated period” that precedes an election.119 These 
limits are accompanied by a requirement to register with the Electoral 
Commission and, if more than $100,000 is spent, file a post-election return 
outlining the nature of that spending.120 The purpose of controls is three-
fold. First, they require those trying to influence the electorate to identify 
themselves, which in turn allows the electorate to judge the reliability of 
the information source. Second, they operate as a kind of “anti avoidance” 
measure to buttress the spending restrictions applied to the primary 
participants—candidates and political parties—during the regulated 
period. And third, they prevent a well-resourced individual or group 
from being able to “swamp” the election campaign with advertising.
However, the various regulatory restrictions only apply to 
communications that qualify as being “election advertisements”. The 
Electoral Act defines these as being:
an advertisement in any medium that may reasonably be regarded as 
encouraging or persuading voters to do either or both of the following:
(i) to vote, or not to vote, for a type of candidate described or indicated by 
reference to views or positions that are, or are not, held or taken (whether 
or not the name of the candidate is stated):
(ii) to vote, or not to vote, for a type of party described or indicated by 
reference to views or positions that are, or are not, held or taken (whether 
or not the name of the party is stated).121
Specific exemptions then exist for communications from the electoral 
agencies, regular advertisements by members of Parliament of their 
constituency services, the editorial content of media publications, the 
transmission of parliamentary proceedings and “any publication on 
the Internet, or other electronic medium, of personal political views by 
an individual who does not make or receive a payment in respect of the 
publication of those views”.122 Because there may be some uncertainty 
as to whether any given advertisement has the effect specified in the 
legislation, or falls under one of the various exemptions, the Electoral 
Commission has a statutory duty provide advice to anyone who requests 
it.123 Although the Commission’s advice is not a final legal determination 
of the status of the proposed communication, anyone advised that an 
advertisement is an electoral advertisement risks prosecution (and 
possible conviction) if they nevertheless decide to publish it in breach 
118 Electoral Act 1993, s 204F(1).
119 Electoral Act 1993, ss 204B(1)(d), 206V(1).
120 Electoral Act 1993, ss 204L, 206ZC. 
121 Electoral Act 1993, s 3A(1).
122 Electoral Act 1993, s 3A(2).
123 Electoral Act 1993, s 204I.
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of the various regulatory requirements.
This fact then makes the Commission something of a gatekeeper for 
electoral expression. Its understanding and application of the statutory 
test has the practical effect of determining whether or not various 
forms of political communication are able to take place free from 
special regulatory burdens. That role was subject to judicial scrutiny 
on two separate occasions in relation to the 2014 campaign. Greenpeace 
v Electoral Commission124 was an application for judicial review of the 
Commission’s determination that two internet-based environmental 
campaigns qualified as election advertisements. One was specifically 
targeted at the 2014 election, involving several environmental groups 
combining to invite voters to sign up as a “Climate Voter” via a dedicated 
website.125 Doing so, voters were told, “means that you want real action 
on climate change and you’re prepared to use your vote to get it. It says 
you support strategies to rapidly phase out fossil fuels and grow New 
Zealand’s clean energy and low-carbon potential.” Although the site was 
avowedly non-partisan in that it did not formally endorse any party, 
it did contain a live Twitter feed in which political parties were asked 
(and were able to answer) various questions about where they stood on 
climate related issues. The second website was a Greenpeace campaign 
opposing offshore drilling for oil,126 launched some nine months before 
the election was held. It shows what appears to be the website for the 
Minister of Energy and Resources, Simon Bridges, which is progressively 
covered by a rising tide of oil until all that is left is Greenpeace’s logo and 
a short statement relating to the issue of oil exploration. The second case 
of Watson and Jones v Electoral Commission127 involved a satirical song with 
accompanying video released for sale by a professional blues musician 
some four months before polling day.128 Entitled “Planet Key”, it poked 
fun at the current Prime Minister, while also containing lyrics such as “if 
you want compassion, don’t vote for me”. For this reason, the Electoral 
Commission advised that it constituted an electoral advertisement, a 
decision that the musician and creator of the video then challenged.  
Between them, these two cases addressed three important issues:
1. What is the line between issue-related political advertising that 
may influence an election and “pure” issue-related political 
advertising?
2. Can “pure” issue-related advertising change its status as an 
election nears?
3. What sorts of communications constitute an “advertisement”?
The first issue involves the need to distinguish between communications 
that have the effect of influencing voters’ behaviour at the polls and 
124 [2014] NZHC 2135.
125 http://www.climatevoter.org.nz.
126 http://www.simon-bridges.co.nz.
127 [2014] NZHC 666.
128 The song and video can be viewed at https://vimeo.com/102441715.
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general policy-oriented discussion or advocacy. Only the former are 
intended to be subject to regulation under the Electoral Act. This issue 
was critical in the Greenpeace v Electoral Commission case. Greenpeace 
argued that as the Climate Voter website represented a non-partisan 
effort to encourage all parties to adopt climate-friendly policy and 
did not specifically identify or endorse the policy of any given party, 
it should fall outside the statutory definition. Greenpeace thus urged 
the High Court to adopt an interpretation of election advertising that 
excluded all communications that referred to policy issues without it 
being “objectively apparent” which party or candidate the advertisement 
intends to support or oppose.129 However, while the High Court endorsed 
the general principle that “pure” issue advocacy is not captured by the 
legislation,130 it disagreed that the Climate Voter website was of this 
nature. The Court noted that the Electoral Act is worded in a way that 
includes advertisements that only refer to issues, provided that they 
also objectively have the effect of encouraging or persuading voters 
to vote for or against some party.131 It also accepted that making such 
communications subject to regulation was a justifiable limit on the right to 
freedom of expression guaranteed by the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act. 132 
And because the Climate Voter website provided a “yardstick” by which 
parties’ policies could be judged (“support strategies to rapidly phase 
out fossil fuels and grow New Zealand’s clean energy and low-carbon 
potential”), while several parties had expressed their endorsement or 
rejection of that goal on the site, the objective effect of the website as a 
whole was to encourage voters to support or oppose those parties.133 The 
High Court thus agreed with the Electoral Commission’s advice that the 
Climate Voter website was an election advertisement.
However, the Court then found that the Electoral Commission had 
erred in advising that the second website—the “Simon Bridges” protest 
page—also was an election advertisement. The Commission had accepted 
that when the website first appeared it was pure issue advertising as it 
formed a part of a wider campaign against a particular governmental 
policy that made no reference to any election. But it claimed that with 
the announcement of the election and onset of the campaign the website 
transformed into an election advertisement in that it then objectively 
appeared to encourage or persuade people not to vote for Simon Bridges 
personally, or his National Party generally. In rejecting the Commission’s 
position, the Court noted that it was important to protect a space for free 
discussion of policy matters even as the electoral campaign commenced, 
not least because Parliament could still be sitting and debating legislative 
issues in this period.134 The fact that the website was part of a long-
129 Greenpeace v Electoral Commission [2014] NZHC 2135 at [48].
130 Greenpeace v Electoral Commission [2014] NZHC 2135 at [47].
131 Greenpeace v Electoral Commission [2014] NZHC 2135 at [60].
132 Greenpeace v Electoral Commission [2014] NZHC 2135 at [79].
133 Greenpeace v Electoral Commission [2014] NZHC 2135 at [91]–[93].
134 Greenpeace v Electoral Commission [2014] NZHC 2135 at [121].
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running advocacy campaign, 135 that it targeted Simon Bridges in the 
context of his role as responsible Minister and made no overt mention 
of the election at all136 were all considered part of the relevant context in 
which an objective observer would decide whether the website could 
“reasonably be regarded” as advocating support or opposition to him at 
the polls. And given that context, the Court declared that the website did 
not have the required effect, and so was not an election advertisement.137
In comparison, the critical issue in Watson and Jones v Electoral 
Commission was not whether the message at issue reasonably could be 
regarded as encouraging or persuading voters not to support the National 
Party and its leader, John Key. The song and video’s creators freely 
acknowledged that it could do so.138 Instead, the court had to determine 
whether a song and video made by individuals as a personal artistic 
statement was an “advertisement” in the context of the legislation. In a 
lengthy judgment139 that traversed the history of why electoral speech 
came to be regulated in New Zealand, Clifford J concluded that it was 
not. It was possible to read the word “advertisement” in the context of 
the Act as meaning a “commercial” or “paid announcement” rather than 
giving it the dictionary definition of “the action of calling the attention of 
others”.140 And because applying the various Electoral Act regulations to 
Messers Watson and Jones’ work would be an unjustifiable limit on their 
right to free expression,141 Clifford J found that s 6 of the New Zealand 
Bill of Rights Act required him to prefer the meaning that avoided this 
outcome. Given that the song and video were a personal creation—no-
one had paid the creators to produce the item—and that they were made 
available for free play on the radio or television and free viewing on 
the internet, it therefore was not an “advertisement” that fell under the 
Electoral Act’s regulatory ambit.142
These twin cases help to better define exactly what sorts of messages 
relating to electoral politics are and are not captured by the Electoral 
Act’s regulatory reach. Reviewing them, two points emerge. The first 
is that the Electoral Commission has taken a somewhat conservative, 
135 Greenpeace v Electoral Commission [2014] NZHC 2135 at [124].
136 Greenpeace v Electoral Commission [2014] NZHC 2135 at [123].
137 Greenpeace v Electoral Commission [2014] NZHC 2135 at [132].
138 Watson & Jones v Electoral Commission [2014] NZHC 666 at [180].
139 Part of the reason for the judgment’s length was that the Electoral 
Commission had also warned that the song and video were “election 
programmes” under the Broadcasting Act 1989 (NZ), and so could not be 
played on either television or radio. Clifford J also found this advice to 
be wrong, as the ban only applied to paid election programmes; Watson 
& Jones v Electoral Commission [2014] NZHC 666 at [195]–[211].
140 Watson & Jones v Electoral Commission [2014] NZHC 666 at [176]–[194].
141 Watson & Jones v Electoral Commission [2014] NZHC 666 at [167]–[170].
142 Clifford J also found that even if the song and video was an “election 
advertisement”, the statutory exemptions for “editorial content” and 
“personal political views through an electronic medium” also applied; 
Watson & Jones v Electoral Commission [2014] NZHC 666 at [226] & [236].
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literalist approach to the legislative provisions. There is a perhaps 
understandable institutional reason for it doing so. If electoral contestants 
were to rely on the Commission’s advice that some message is not an 
election advertisement and a court were to later disagree with this 
assessment, then the contestant may have been led to commit potentially 
quite serious criminal offences that have the capacity to overturn an 
election result. So the Commission has erred on the side of caution in 
its interpretation and application of the statutory tests. However, that 
inherent conservatism carries costs. There will have been a number of 
individuals or groups wishing to say things during the 2014 campaign 
who will not have done so after being advised by the Commission that 
their speech actions will attract liability under the Electoral Act’s reach. At 
least some of those speech actions will have posed no real threat to the 
election process, in terms of being the kinds of electoral messages that 
Parliament intended to regulate in order to protect against the influence 
of large-scale wealthy interests. Consequently, the courts’ intervention 
to pare back the legislation’s reach into the realm of public discourse is 
to be welcomed.143
5 Conclusion
This article has sought to outline a range of legal issues that arose during 
New Zealand’s 2014 general election and place them in some sort of 
broader context. A concluding question then is, what (if anything) might 
occur in response to them? New Zealand has developed two institutional 
avenues for addressing the sorts of issues discussed in this article. First, 
the Electoral Commission is required to produce within six months of 
the election a report to the Minister of Justice outlining any issues that 
the Commission has identified with the electoral process and making 
recommendations for change.144 Second, by convention Parliament’s 
Justice and Electoral Committee holds an inquiry to examine the 
law and administrative procedures for the conduct of parliamentary 
elections in light of the previous general election. This inquiry has 
already commenced, with public submissions to it closing at the end of 
March. Taken together, these processes provide an established means of 
reviewing electoral law and changing it if and when it is felt necessary. 
However, any such changes are a temporary and contingent response 
to an basic fact about how elections function. For the next electoral cycle 
inevitably will reveal new and different disputes about the application of 
the nation’s electoral laws, which will in turn demand yet more changes 
to them. This recurrence is because, as noted already, “elections—along 
143 The Electoral Commission has sought guidance from the Court of Appeal 
on several points emerging from these two cases.  That matter had not 
been resolved as at the time of writing.
144 Electoral Act 1993, s 8(1). See Electoral Commission, Report of the 




with the legal rules that govern the electoral process—will always 
produce disagreement, even as they resolve the question of who will 
govern the country.”145 That is a basic and inescapable feature of the 
electoral law field; one that keeps it an ever fresh and continually 
interesting topic for study. 
145 Geddis, above n 11, p 17.
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